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The Jewel in the Crown: Co-optive capacity and participation during austerity in Cardiff and San 
Sebastian-Donostia  
Dr Valeria Guarneros-Meza, I. Tellería, A. Blas and Dr Madeleine Pill 
By comparing the cities of Cardiff and San Sebastián-Donostia (Donostia), we argue that local 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ Iﾗ-opt provides a valid framework to understand changes in citizen 
participation under fiscal austerity. The argument is based on the close interrelationships among co-
optation, legitimacy and procedural regulation (Selznick, 1949). These concepts help to understand 
how citizen participation is maintained in periods of instability, experienced by city governments 
during and in the aftermath of extra-local financial crisis. We argue that local governmenデげゲ 
legitimacy is maintained insofar as it shows capacity to co-opt, defined as practices and processes of 
ﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾗﾐが I;ヮデ┌ヴWが けデWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ;ﾐS ﾏｷﾐｷﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデく TｴWゲW WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆ ｷﾐ デ;ﾐSWﾏ 
with those factors that have been identified in cities experiencing austerity under a longer-term 
neoliberalizing discourse (Peck, 2012). The interwoven framework between capacity to co-opt and 
け;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ ┌ヴH;ﾐｷゲﾏげ ｷゲ ┌ゲWS デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ┗;ヴｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ デｴW デ┘ﾗ IｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ デｴWｷヴ 
administrative processes, but also to unpick the contradictions that emerge in practice during the 
liminal time between fiscal crisis and normality (Bayirbag et al., 2017).   
TｴW Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐ ｷゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデｷﾐｪ ;ゲ Hﾗデｴ IｷデｷWゲ ゲ┞ﾏHﾗﾉｷ┣W デｴW ヮヴｷSW ふけデｴW ﾃW┘Wﾉ ﾗa デｴW Iヴﾗ┘ﾐげぶ ﾐWIWゲゲary 
to sustain the national identities of Wales and the Basque Country. In selecting these two cities, we 
contrast how their power struggle to maintain co-optive and regulatory powers is shaped by their 
constitutional interdependence with national and subnational tiers of government - which have 
ヮヴﾗデWIデWS デｴWﾏ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ﾗヴ SWﾉ;┞WS デｴW WaaWIデゲ ﾗa デｴW ヲヰヰΒ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iヴｷゲｷゲく F┌ヴデｴWヴﾏﾗヴWが Hﾗデｴ IｷデｷWゲげ 
reliance on the tourism industry (sport, culture or gastronomy) and their lack of mass protest, albeit 
for different historical reasons, contribute to frame the debate on how participation unfolds in 
periods of fiscal austerity.   
The paper is structured as follows.  It first presents a framework of co-optive capacity, which is then 
juxtaposed with the factors compriゲｷﾐｪ PWIﾆげゲ ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ ┌ヴH;ﾐｷゲﾏ ┌ﾐSWヴ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ 
aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘WS H┞ ; HヴｷWa IﾗﾐデW┝デ┌;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa W;Iｴ Iｷデ┞げゲ aｷゲI;ﾉ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪが ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ﾐS 
participatory structures, providing a foundation for the subsequent findings which contrast the two 
IｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS SｷゲI┌ゲゲ ｴﾗ┘  け;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ Iﾗ-ﾗヮデｷ┗Wげ a;Iデﾗヴゲ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ ｷﾐ ヮヴ;IデｷIWく Fｷﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴW ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa 
the findings are considered, including reflections on the significance of the juxtaposed framework of 
co-optive capacity under austerity.  
Co-optation, legitimacy and regulation  
Recent studies of austerity and crisis have focused on the variegated effects of urban austerity 
(Bayirbag et al., 2017; Peck et al., 2013). The procedural administrative mechanisms used by local 
government to cope with this type of phenomenon have received less emphasis. In addressing this 
gap, we use the term austerity to refer to the fiscal austerity that many local authorities in Spain and 
the United Kingdom have experienced as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. Fiscal austerity tends to 
be studied in terms of two types of change: the declining financial resources of local authorities 
which directly affect service provision; and changes in the discourse (policy and practice) of 
austerity, materialized in policy documentation and administrative arrangements that regulate the 
extent to which responsibilities are downloaded and offloaded.   
 
We focus on co-optation, procedural regulation and legitimacy as mechanisms to establish social 
order (rules) by local governments through their governing processes of service provision in periods 
of fiscal austerity. We treat the three terms as complementary insofar as governments are 
IﾗﾏヮWﾉﾉWS デﾗ ゲｴﾗ┘ デｴW┞ ｴ;┗W I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デﾗ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐS デﾗ ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ ﾐWWSゲが H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ aﾗヴ 
residentゲ ﾗヴ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌Wﾐデゲ デﾗ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣W ﾗヴ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏｷ┣W ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ ヴﾗﾉW ;ﾐS ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ ふSWﾉ┣ﾐｷIﾆが ヱΓヴΓぶく 
Selznick defines formal co-ﾗヮデ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ けデｴW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa ぷヮ┌HﾉｷIﾉ┞へ ;HゲﾗヴHｷﾐｪ ﾐW┘ WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW 
leadership of a policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its 
ゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗヴ W┝ｷゲデWﾐIWげ ふヱΓヴΓぎヱンぶく HWﾐIWが Iﾗﾗヮデ;デｷﾗﾐ けa┌ﾉaｷﾉゲ Hﾗデｴ デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa SWaWﾐSｷﾐｪ 
ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ ;ﾐS デｴW ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴｷﾐｪ Iｴ;ﾐﾐWﾉゲ ﾗa Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS SｷヴWIデｷﾗﾐげ 
(1949:14).   
SWﾉ┣ﾐｷIﾆげゲ SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デW aﾗヴ ﾗ┌ヴ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ;ゲ ｷデ IWﾐデヴWゲ ﾗﾐ S;ｷﾉ┞ H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;デｷI ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ふｷくWく 
selecting citizen collaborators, implementing project objectives) related to the democratic ideal of 
local participation.  The administrative function of co-optation is highly interlinked with a local 
;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞げゲ I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐが ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘W ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS ;ゲ デｴW ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲ デﾗ aﾗヴﾏ┌ﾉ;デWが 
monitor and enforce rules that regulate processes of service provision (Levi-Faud, 2014; Menahem 
and Stein, 2013). Meanwhile, regulation is understood as a set of local procedural norms, practices 
and organizational arrangements that are the outcome of coordinated social and political relations 
in capitalist economies (Painter, 1998).  
Fﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ SWﾉ┣ﾐｷIﾆげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ, the links between capacity to govern and co-optation become 
evident when government invites the participation of organized civil society and organic community 
groups into (a) the provision of services and (b) the formulation and monitoring of rules of service 
provision. We argue that in periods of fiscal crisis, the capacity to govern can be interpreted as a 
capacity to co-opt insofar as government actors perceive that their legitimacy is called into question 
as a result of diminishing financial resources to govern. Their legitimacy may also be questioned in 
relation to the increased role of civil society groups, invited to participate in service provision before 
or during the crisis.   
To understand capacity to co-ﾗヮデ ｷデ ｷゲ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ デﾗ ┌ﾐヮ;Iﾆ SWﾉ┣ﾐｷIﾆげゲ definition of cooptation. For 
this purpose, we deploy four elements drawn from debates in public administration which are 
significant to understand participation under urban austerity. The first is the assumption that co-
optation implies some degree of negotiation between a powerful and a less powerful party. Hence 
co-optation implies an unequal relationship portrayed as domination through justificatory means 
(legitimacy). In particular, we are interested in relationships between government officers and 
citizens found in debates regarding clientelism and patronage (Auyero, 2011; Selznick, 1949). The 
second is capture of non-governmental actors and their resources into state-sponsored initiatives. 
Such capture may involve either corrupt practices such as offering public monies in exchange for 
ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ ;ﾐS デ;IデｷIゲ デｴ;デ ﾉｷﾏｷデ ｷﾐヮ┌デ ﾗa ヴｷ┗;ﾉ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲ ふAデデ┌┞Wヴが ヲヰヱヵぶが ﾗヴ けﾉ;┘-;HｷSｷﾐｪげ ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ 
that gradually convince the less powerful party to adopt the beliefs and practices of the powerful. All 
types of I;ヮデ┌ヴW IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デW デﾗ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗヴ H┌ｷﾉSｷﾐｪ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞く   
TｴW デｴｷヴS WﾉWﾏWﾐデ ｷゲ けデWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ふKﾗデｴ;ヴｷが ヲヰヰヵぶ ﾗa ゲWヴ┗ｷIW-delivery processes that involve the 
participation of citizens or civil society in contexts where discourses of democratic participation and 
neoliberalization co-exist (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Technicalization pinpoints practices related to 
デｴW けﾏﾗﾐﾗヮﾗﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa W┝ヮWヴデｷゲW ;ﾐS ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ H┞ ヮヴﾗaWゲゲｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣ｷﾐｪ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ゲデ;デW ;Iデﾗヴゲげが 
which, at least initially, tend to be alien and incomprehensible to non-state actors or citizens, thus 
limiting their ability to develop critical, challenging or emancipatory approaches (Kothari, 2005). 
Finally, co-optation aims to minimize or buffer conflict during processes of service provision, albeit 
never eradicating it completely (Spicer, 2010). The minimization of conflict is not necessarily 
negative (i.e. limiting emancipation, depoliticizing a process). The buffering of conflict may be 
positive, such as to avoid violence, promoデW ヴWゲヮWIデ ﾗa ふヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ぶ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ けSWゲヮｷデW SWデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
デｴWｷヴ ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏWげ ふｷくWく WﾉWIデﾗヴ;ﾉ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲぶ ﾗヴ デﾗ ゲ;IヴｷaｷIW W┗Wヴ┞S;┞ IﾗﾏﾏｷデﾏWﾐデゲ けaﾗヴ デｴW ﾉﾗﾐｪ デWヴﾏ 
ヮヴWゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ﾉﾉｷWゲげ ふH;ﾏヮゲｴｷヴWが ヱΓΓΓぎヴΓ-50 & 73). These four elements feed into our framework 
to understand variation in capacity to co-opt.  
Neoliberal austerity and co-optive capacity  
Neoliberal reforms - けSWヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が SWIWﾐデヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ﾗaaﾉﾗ;Sｷﾐｪ ﾗa 
responsibilities, and internationalization - ｴ;┗W ヴWゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWS デｴW ゲデ;デWげゲ ヴﾗle from provider to 
facilitator, associated with roll-back and roll-out strategies adopted by the state (Jessop, 2002; Peck 
and Tickell, 2002); and from facilitator to disciplinarian (Wacquant, 2010). It has been widely 
acknowledged that there has not been ; ┘ｷデｴSヴ;┘;ﾉ H┌デ ; ヴWゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW ゲデ;デWげゲ ヴﾗﾉWが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;ゲ 
inevitably resulted in degrees of conflict or resistance by incumbent elites (Robinson, 2004; Harrison, 
2010), tiers of government (Newman, 2014), and marginalized groups (della Porta and Mattoni, 
2014).  
Conflict and resistance against neoliberalism have been present over the last 40 years, albeit in some 
cases not manifested as protest or riot (Morton, 2003; Tonkiss, 2013), nor seeking transformation 
(Dikeç and Swyngedouw, 2017). It is in such cases that local governments are more successful in 
implementing co-optive mechanisms to capture dissidents and gradually convince them to adopt 
processes of governance that have commonly accompanied neoliberal governing regimes, 
characterized by waves of roll-back and roll-out strategies (Brenner et al., 2010; Davies, 2011; 
Swyngedouw, 2005). In epochs of financial crisis, conflict and resistance have taken the form of 
protests and riots by the marginalized in important urban centres.  But in secondary European cities 
where mass protest has not occured, such as Cardiff and Donostia, the conflict has been 
encapsulated in governing decisions by incumbent government elites that invite participation and 
volunteering.  Co-optation is based on our assumption that as crises (financial included) bring 
uncertainty (Bayirbag, et al., 2017; Peck et al., 2013), the governance mechanisms that local 
governments use to establish participation destabilize, such as procedural-administrative regulations 
that contribute to H┌ｷﾉSｷﾐｪ ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ ﾗﾐ ; S;ｷﾉ┞ H;ゲｷゲく    
Our approach contributes to broader discussions about urban austerity. We find that it speaks to the 
けHﾗ┌ﾐS;ヴｷWゲげ ;ﾐS けヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲげ WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa aヴ;ﾏｷﾐｪ ┌ヴH;ﾐ Iヴｷゲｷゲ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS H┞ B;┞ｷヴH;ｪ Wデ ;ﾉく ふヲヰヱΑ). These 
;┌デｴﾗヴゲ ;ヴｪ┌W デｴ;デ Iヴｷゲｷゲ ﾐWWSゲ デﾗ HW けSｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;デWS aヴﾗﾏ ｷデゲ ;ﾐデﾗﾐ┞ﾏゲが ﾐﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗヴ Wケ┌ｷﾉｷHヴｷ┌ﾏげが H┞ 
paying careful attention to the liminal time between crisis and normality (2017:8). By focusing on 
these two cities, the cooptive capacity framework provides a way of understanding how such 
けﾉｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞げ a;ヴWゲ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ ゲヮ;IW ;ﾐS デｷﾏWく FﾗI┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ ﾉｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ｴWﾉヮゲ デﾗ ┌ﾐヮｷIﾆ デｴW WﾏHWSSWSﾐWゲゲ ﾗa 
neoliberalism in the fabric of everyday policy-making, which we argue is important to understand 
neoliberalisﾏげゲ S┌ヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS ヴWI┌ヴヴWﾐデ Iﾗﾐデヴ;SｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ふC;ｴｷﾉﾉ ;ﾐS Kﾗﾐｷﾐｪゲが ヲヰヱΑき Tﾗﾐﾆｷゲゲが ヲヰヱンぶく  
The 2008 financial crisis in the western hemisphere has posed challenges to the neoliberal state and 
consequently brought the strategies and mechanisms through which regulation can function into 
question. Peck (2012) posits that these challenges would be felt primarily by subnational levels of 
government, particularly those located in urban settings which have concentrated partnerships and 
contracted-out forms of organization in service provision.  He argues that one of the effects of fiscal 
austerity on neoliberal strategies and projects has been the deepening of decentralization through 
SW┗ﾗﾉ┗WS aｷゲI;ﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ﾗヴ けゲﾗaデ H┌SｪWデ;ヴ┞ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲげく  TｴWゲW SｷゲデヴｷH┌デW aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ヴisk in the delivery of 
services from national to regional and local levels (downloading) and from the local level of 
government to community/ third sector organizations (TSOs) and private sector contractors 
(offloading). For Peck, austerity urbanism is abo┌デ けﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗデｴWヴゲ ヮ;┞ デｴW ヮヴｷIW ﾗa aｷゲI;ﾉ 
ヴWデヴWﾐIｴﾏWﾐデげ ふヲヰヱヲぎ ヶンヲぶ ;デ ;ﾐ┞ ゲI;ﾉW ﾗa ;Iデｷﾗﾐく TｴW ┘;┞ゲ デｴ;デ けﾗデｴWヴゲげ ふﾐﾗﾐ-ゲデ;デW ;Iデﾗヴゲぶ けヮ;┞ デｴW 
ヮヴｷIWげ ｷゲ IﾗﾐデW┝デ-contingent.   
Fﾗ┌ヴ ﾗa デｴW ゲW┗Wﾐ a;Iデﾗヴゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ IﾗﾏヮヴｷゲW PWIﾆげゲ ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ ┌ヴH;ﾐｷゲﾏ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ;ヴW ┗;ﾉid here given their 
relationship with co-optive capacity: rollback redux, risk-shifting rationalities, austerity governance 
and placebo dependency. They are valid as they are more strategic than the other three (downsizing 
and leaner local states, fire-scale privatizations and financial tournaments), which are more tactical.  
PWIﾆげゲ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ｷゲ ┌ゲWa┌ﾉ ;ゲ ｷデ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ ; IﾗﾏヮヴWｴWﾐゲｷ┗W aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ デｴ;デ ;Iﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWゲ デｴW SｷaaWヴWﾐデ 
SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW ゲデ;デWげゲ ヴWIﾗﾐaｷｪ┌ヴ;デｷﾗﾐく  Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ｷデ ﾗ┗Wヴﾉﾗﾗﾆゲ デｴW SWデ;ｷﾉWS ﾏｷﾐ┌デｷae of everyday 
policy that helps to identify the contradictions in which the austerity discourse is immersed and the 
way it is grounded in different contexts. Given our focus on co-optation under austerity, we develop 
; aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ デｴ;デ ﾃ┌┝デ;ヮﾗゲWゲ PWIﾆげゲ aﾗ┌r factors with the four co-optive elements discussed in the 
previous section (Table 1).  
Rollback neoliberalism has been explained by Peck and colleagues (Brenner et al., 2010) as the 
rollback of the state in providing specific goods and services.  It was followed by a rollout wave of 
state restructuring since the 1980s which paved the way for the downloading and offloading of state 
responsibilities to third sector and community organizations, encapsulated in the proliferation of 
public-private and community-public partnerships across different cities in the western hemisphere. 
The rollback redux, derived from the 2008 crisis, aims to roll back the strategies rolled out a 
generation ago. For example, the state has withdrawn grants formerly made to community groups 
to build community-public partnerships but seeks to maintain collaborative links with the 
community to carry on delivering local services.  Links are clear with the capacity to co-opt.  For 
example, it can be argued that the rollout process worked as a way of capturing dissident citizens, 
while beginning to prepare them for the technical and expert knowledge required for inter-sectoral 
collaboration to occur (Barnes et al., 2007; Kothari, 2005). In preparing for the rollback redux, 
interdependency and organizational mimicry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) between state actors and 
citizens also developed. Thus any conflict associated with this process tends to be concentrated at 
the implementation stage (Spicer, 2010).  
Peck identifies austerity governance when forms of management by audit and rule by accountancy 
are consolidated, an interpretation discussed in detail by scholars of public administration and 
development studies. Such managerial practices are associated with professionalizing and 
technicalizing interventions of both state and non-state actors (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Kothari, 
ヲヰヰヵぶが デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW けS;デ; ｪWﾐWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ﾐW┘ aﾗヴﾏゲ ﾗa ゲデ;デW ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデが ﾐW┘ ┘;┞ゲ ﾗa 
managing expenditure, [or] meetings to discuss outputs and inputs into adminiゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲげ 
ふH;ヴヴｷゲﾗﾐが ヲヰヱヰぎヱヰΒぶく  TｴWゲW  ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ;ヴW ;ﾉゲﾗ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ けﾐW┘ ヮ┌HﾉｷI ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデげ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘ｷデｴ 
economic globalization has reached countries beyond the global north (Jreisat, 2001).  It is the 
technicalization of everyday practice, through the rule-making and rule-monitoring required to 
manage and coordinate the delivery of collaborative services, which highlights the links to co-optive 
capacity.  
In the global north, the responsibility to couple managerial processes with budgetary constraints has 
been downloaded to subnational levels of government. Peck terms this risk-shifting rationalities, 
where city governance management processes promote deployment of downloading and offloading 
tactics. Thus  professionalizing and technicalizing interventions are not only passed down from 
national to subnational levels of government, but also from state to non-state actors. Expenditure 
management and monitoring of processes to achieve outputs and outcomes starts being conducted 
by TSOs, which play an intermediary role between the state and community actors (Bovaird, 2014; 
Chaskin and Greenberg, 2015).  While aiming to pass responsibility to third sector and community 
organizations, Peck argues that it is likely that the poorest of the population will be impacted the 
ﾏﾗゲデ ;ゲ デｴW┞ デWﾐS デﾗ ｴ;┗W aW┘Wヴ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉゲ ;ﾐS ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲ デﾗ デ;ﾆW ﾗﾐ デｴW ゲデ;デWげゲ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴｷ;ﾉ 
responsibilities. In response, governments have identified the need to recruit officers whose skills 
span organizational or sectorial boundaries to bridge the requirements of government with the 
interests or needs of non-state partners (authors; Skelcher et al., 2013). In particular, these officers 
seek to promulgate community self-management, albeit subject to the procedural regulations 
stablished by the (local) state as a way to ensure co-optation. However, this process allows room for 
negotiation and consequently tensions may traduce into conflict as nonstate actors pursue tactics 
and mechanisms of self-management that question those sponsored by the state (Elwood, 2006).  
Peck argues that placebo dependency arises when local government shows an increasing mismatch 
between its capacity to act locally to achieve economic growth and social development and the 
ｷﾏヮWヴ;デｷ┗W けデﾗ HW ゲWWﾐ デﾗ HW ;Iデｷﾐｪげ ﾉﾗI;ﾉﾉ┞ ふ2012: 648). This term is useful because to continue co-
opting, government wants to be seen, despite the challenges brought by fiscal austerity, to be doing 
something. In periods of uncertainty this is often as important as getting a result. However, the 
nature of the mismatch between capacity and imperative to-be-seen-to-be-acting locally will depend 
on the approaches to fiscal austerity that different cities experience and adopt. Barbehön and 
M┑ﾐIｴ ふヲヰヱヵぎ ヱンぶ ;ヴｪ┌W デｴ;デ け;ﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ global financial and economic crisis is translated into local 
funding crisis デｴｷゲ ｷゲ SﾗﾐW ┗Wヴ┞ ゲヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ﾐS ｷﾐ ;IIﾗヴS;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ ﾉﾗI;ﾉﾉ┞ ゲヮWIｷaｷI ┘ｷSWヴ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲげ 
ゲｴ;ヮWS H┞ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ;ﾐS ゲデ;ﾆWｴﾗﾉSWヴゲげ S;ｷﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐゲく Fﾗヴ デｴWゲW ;┌デｴﾗヴゲが ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ 
can create narratives of reinvention, exploit previously existing narratives or react with narratives 
that blame or protect the city from external threats caused by the dominance of financial capitalism. 
We argue that these narratives can be combined, especially over time.  Local governments at first 
may show resignation to fiscal austerity. Over time as they comply because of a lack of a perceived 
viable alternative に IﾗｷﾐWS け;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ ヴW;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふD;┗ｷWゲ ;ﾐS Tｴﾗﾏヮゲﾗﾐが ヲヰヱヶぶ - they reinvent or build 
upon existing narratives that develop through administrative processes and which help to maintain 
their legitimacy. When this assemblage of narratives is applied to participation it is possible to 
encounter tactics that provide opportunities to empower TSOs or community groups, while changes 
to procedural regulation deepen downloading and offloading mechanisms that may contribute to 
co-optive capacity.  
Comparing Cardiff and San Sebastián-Donostia  
TｴW ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉW SWヮﾉﾗ┞WS デﾗ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ デｴW Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐ Sヴ;┘ゲ aヴﾗﾏ けIﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;デｷ┗ｷゲﾏげ ふ‘ﾗHｷﾐゲon, 2011), an 
approach which moves away from traditional patterns centred on similarity and standardization. 
Instead, it focuses on differences, albeit centred on a similar problematic. Two simultaneous but 
unrelated aspects led us to compare Cardiff and Dﾗﾐﾗゲデｷ;く TｴW aｷヴゲデ ┘;ゲ Hﾗデｴ IｷデｷWゲげ ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ 
or delayed effects of the 2008 financial crisis upon their budgets; the second was the lack of mass 
protest in the two cities, in contrast to those which occurred in large cities such as London or Madrid 
against some of the effects of fiscal austerity upon the population (i.e. withdrawal of social and 
housing services).   
C;ヴSｷaa ｷゲ デｴW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげゲ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾉ;ヴｪWゲデ Iｷデ┞ ﾗa W;ﾉWゲ ふヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ンヴヶがヰヰヰが ヲヰヱヱ CWﾐゲ┌ゲぶく Iデ ゲW;デゲ 
the national (regional) government, Welsh Government; hence the city is well known for its service 
economy centred on public sector activities and services such as insurance, real estate, sport and 
cultural tourism and gastronomy.   
Donostia is capital city of Gipuzkoa Province, located just over 100km east of Bilbao. It has 
historically been recognized as a locus for luxury tourism, cultural activities (in 2011 it was awarded 
the 2016 European Capital of Culture) and high-end gastronomy. It has 186,126 inhabitants and the 
metropolitan area has 436,000 (2016 Census).    
To situate the problematic that encompassed both cities in line with the comparativism approach 
requires a contextual review to help identify difference in processes and practice.  Four aspects are 
relevant to our argument: the fiscal structure of the city and region; the political ideology of the 
governing elites; their duration in holding office; and the institutionalization of citizen participation 
┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW IｷデｷWゲげ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWく TｴW ﾉ;デデWヴ ｷゲ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ after cycles of mining and separatist protests 
waned in Wales (1980s) and the Basque Country (1990s), respectively. Analyses of the 2008 financial 
crisis highlight the Basque Country and Navarra as the autonomous regions that encountered the 
least negative WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ Sヮ;ｷﾐく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ ; ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ﾗa デｴW ヴWｪｷﾗﾐゲげ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Sｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞が 
including stable export markets and a low dependency on the construction sector (Méndez et al., 
2015). According to the National and Basque Institutes of Statistics, by 2012-13 Donostia showed 
higher levels of GDP per capita and household income and the lowest rates of unemployment than 
the rest of the Basque Country and Spain.  
Concomitantly, these two regions have a relatively high level of fiscal autonomy compared to other 
autonomous communities in Spain. This enables a revenue system (50-60 per cent above average) to 
respond to agreed and convened decisions taken by their national assemblies and provincial 
councils, which have favoured welfare policies in the last two decades (Cordero Ferrera and Murillo 
Huertas, 2008:14). An exception, however, is observed in the diminishing expenditure on public 
infrastructure which affected the Basque and local tiers of government. The unique circumstances in 
welfare have protected several Basque cities from the negative impacts that the crisis generated for 
social and housing services. Hence, during fieldwork Donostia did not face reduced expenditure in 
social services, though it did undergo cuts to other services such as street maintenance. Moreover, 
the broader discourse of austerity that Spain experienced impacted the politics and management of 
デｴW Iｷデ┞げゲ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏが WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ┌ヴH;ﾐ ヮﾉ;ﾐﾐｷﾐｪく   
In contrast, Wales lacks independent tax raising powers from Whitehall, London. Its fiscal 
dependency led its public services to enjoy initially a relative protection from austerity derived from 
the 2008 financial crisis; partly due to the time lag in English cuts feeding through the formula used 
to set Wales' funding.  These cuts cascaded to Welsh Government in its 2014/15 budget.  Financial 
allocations to local authorities were considered 'by far the worst settlement since devolution' with 
severe budget cuts of over 5% in real terms for 2014/15, rising to 9% by 2015/16 (authors).  Budget 
cuts of some £100 million were sought in the following three years by Cardiff Council.  Welsh 
Government ministers and local politicians blamed the UK government for these cuts.  As a result, 
Cardiff Council has looked to rationalize and reorganize public services, taking advantage of its city-
wide governance model and the Cardiff Debate, a citizen consultation exercise, which helped the 
council to prioritize service provision, especially of community and social services, in the 2014/ 15 
H┌SｪWデく け‘Wjecting austerity altogether was not an option and therefore the future structuring and 
ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞-ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ｴ;S ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ Iﾗ-
production with and commissioning of services from civil society organizations and community 
groups (authors).    
Between 1991 and 2015, Donostia was ruled either by party coalitions or minority governments led 
by the two main Left political parties: the non-nationalist Basque Socialist Party (PSE-EE) and the 
more radical nationalist Euskal Herria Bildu Party (Bildu). Despite the differences between parties, 
the overall political ideology of the city has shared a relatively critical posture against neoliberal 
policies impacting the local welfare state, while promoting citizen participation. However, the lack of 
;Hゲﾗﾉ┌デW ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾐWIWゲゲｷデ;デWS デｴW LWaデげゲ Wﾐｪ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ﾗ┌ゲ ﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾗﾐ 
with other Right-centred political parties (authors, 2016). Cardiff since 1995, has been mainly 
dominated by the Left throuｪｴ デｴW L;Hﾗ┌ヴ P;ヴデ┞が ﾗ┗Wヴ デｷﾏW デｴW ﾉﾗI;ﾉ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ｴ;ゲ ゲｴｷaデWS 
from a strong majority to a simple majority (just over 50% in 2016). During our study, the Labour 
party showed internal divisions between two historical factions: one against budget cuts to social 
services related to leisure, sport and libraries; and the other in favour of these cuts.  However, since 
the 1990s both factions have been supportive of the neoliberal boosterist vision pursued in 
developing and regenerating the city through private housing and infrastructural investment 
(Morgan, 2006; Cardiff Council, 2007).  
Citizen participation has been emblematic of Left parties in the Basque Country and replaced long 
cycles of separatist protest supporting Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. The structure of citizen participation 
flourished in Donostia when PSE-EE took office in 1991. Bildu was in power during the period of 
study and its administration (2011-2015) was characterized by the introduction of more radical 
participatory plans and programmes than the PSE-EE, in response to the formal institutionalization 
of the local 2007 participatory regulation and law. The Bildu government aimed to create a systemic 
participatory structure to overcome fragmentation through city-wide participatory budgeting and a 
strategy that supplemented the accountability of representative government with state-sponsored 
innovations of participation. This strategy sought to enhance the social capital of civil society and 
encourage a participatory culture where citizens were not only consulted about city development 
plans, but also could make decisions within the policy making process. Examples included: Auzolan, a 
neighbourhood regeneration communitarian project; Villa Alegría-Txantxarreka, a community centre 
run by the youth assembly and other grassroots groups; and Casa de las Mujeres, a programme run 
ｷﾐ ; Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ H┌ｷﾉSｷﾐｪ H┞ デｴW Iｷデ┞げゲ aWﾏｷﾐｷゲデ ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ヮヴﾗﾃWIデゲ Iﾗ-produced by local 
government and citizens and civil society associations were found to be closely aligned to the 
management objectives followed by the local council. By the end of the Bildu administration, a city-
wide participatory strategy had proved difficult to implement, in part due to historical differences 
between the central and peripheral areas of the metropolitan zone.   
In contrast, citizen participation in Cardiff has not been emblematic of the Labour Party, instead 
collaboration and partnership have been the preferred terms in local discourse. Since 2000, citizen 
participation in the city has been coupled with partnership working through the national poverty 
reduction programme, Communities First (CF). Cardiff holds a handful of highly deprived areas that 
have been part of the CF. CF partnerships were developed involving grassroots groups and activists 
who depended on resources from the Welsh Government and local council to develop a range of 
projects to improve education and health across the vulnerable population.  
The result after 10 years of sponsorship has been empowerment of several civil society groups that 
have learned to work and co-produce with the (local) state. Over the past few years, partnership 
working has culminated in a collaborative model, Cardiff Partnership, which through a multi-agency 
body composed of governmental and umbrella civil society organizations has aimed to identify and 
tackle policy challenges related to housing, social care and anti-social behavior. The model also 
manages the provision of local services city-wide. Although citizen participation is not a key element 
of the model, the council has considered it inclusive of citizens as civil society organizations and CF 
partnerships have become central in delivering neighbourhood services, especially since the financial 
crisis. The local council has also promoted other participatory initiatives such as citizen panels, 
meetings and consultations, but these have been carried out in a fragmented way responding to 
specific policy needs regarding planning, policing, and neighbourhood renewal.   
Fieldwork in the two cities was conducted through semi-structured interviews (24 in Donostia and 
29 in Cardiff) between summer 2013 and spring 2016. Through a snowballing technique, we 
interviewed social activists and TSO officers, state officers involved in citizen participation and social 
service provision, and local politicians. The first stage of data collection comprised an exploratory 
approach to understanding citizen participation; this was followed by further interviews with local 
actors who played an important role in the citizen participation process of each city; and the final 
stage followed up specific processes relevant to each city, wherein some participants were 
interviewed for a second time. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. The transcribed 
data were coded deploying terms selected to unpick the daily practices of capture, technicalization, 
negotiation and buffering conflict, as contained in the framework of co-optive capacity. These terms 
were: rule making, rule monitoring, risk management, selection of collaborators, determination of 
goals, resource management, and procedural learning. The analysis in the next section is based upon 
a systematic coding of these terms across all 53 interviews conducted in both cities. The interview 
quotes in the next section were deliberately selected to emphasize the particularities we wanted to 
underline in our argument.   
Discussion of findings  
Because of the period in which data were collected, an analysis of the initial, liminal responses (i.e. 
the transition from fiscal pre-austerity to post-austerity) of both city governments and their impact 
upon citizen participation is discussed. The analysis is structured by the austerity co-optive factors 
presented above. Each of the four, paired factors is not evenly manifested between the two cities. 
This is to be expected because the comparative rationale departs from a similar problematic and 
focuses instead on specific contextual factors.  
PヴWヮ;ヴｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ ヴﾗﾉﾉH;Iﾆ ヴWS┌┝ ﾗヴ aﾉW┝ｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾏ┌ゲIﾉWゲ ﾗa けI;ヮデ┌ヴWげ  
Like the rest of the UK, the pre-austerity period in Cardiff was characterized by partnership working 
between the state and local communities/TSOs. It was a period during which models of roll-over 
funding by the state (national and local) to community groups and TSOs were very common. This 
created TSO financial dependency upon the state, while the inculcation of civil society co-
ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ ┘;ゲ HWｷﾐｪ SW┗WﾉﾗヮWSく Iデ ┘;ゲ ; ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa けﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ヮWﾗヮﾉW ﾏﾗヴW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHﾉWげく A ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴ 
experience is observed in Donostia, where partnership working between the public and third sectors 
before 2010 was highly promoted. This characteristic has not been unique to Donostia, but to the 
whole Gipuzkoa Province (Arrieta Frutos and Etxezarreta Etxarri, 2012).  
By the time budget cuts reached Cardiff, the responsibilization of civil society had not reached the 
ﾉW┗Wﾉゲ ﾗa ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ SWゲｷヴWSく Aゲ ﾗﾐW ﾉﾗI;ﾉ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ﾗaaｷIWヴ ヮ┌デ ｷデぎ けWWげヴW ﾐﾗデ ;ゲ ｪﾗﾗS ;デ Wﾐｪ;ｪｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ 
デｴW Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデｷWゲ ;ゲ ┘W Iﾗ┌ﾉS HWく  I ゲデｷﾉﾉ デｴｷﾐﾆ デｴ;デ ┘Wげ┗W ｪﾗデ デｴW ﾉWｪ;I┞ ﾗa Sﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ ヮWﾗヮﾉW rather than 
Sﾗｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ ヮWﾗヮﾉWげく  B┌デ ｷﾐ ;SSヴWゲゲｷﾐｪ H┌SｪWデ I┌デゲが デｴｷゲ ﾗaaｷIWヴ IﾗﾐIﾉ┌SWS けI デｴｷﾐﾆ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ;ヴW SWaｷﾐｷデWﾉ┞ 
Iｴ;ﾐｪｷﾐｪ ぷHWIﾗﾏｷﾐｪ ﾉWゲゲ SWヮWﾐSWﾐデへげ ふGOっCぱヱぶく  
Therefore, the start of the austerity period was characterized by a transition in the allocation of 
funds; from a grant recipient model of funding that rolled over funding from state to civil society 
agencies to a very prescriptive service delivery model, where TSOs or equivalent were essentially 
tied to the processes that the local council wanted these agencies to pursue. As Cardiff Council 
envisaged its budget cuts, it began thinking of new ways to tighten control of TSOs through the 
Cardiff Partnership.   Social activists were critical of this model, one stated:  
Increasingly I think the [Welsh] State is most comfortable relating to organizations that mirror itself 
and many of the big NGOs have essentially adopted a statist bureaucratic set-┌ヮ W┗Wﾐ デｴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW┞げヴW 
doing voluntary sector work.  They set themselves up with a Chief Executive and a hierarchy and so 
on and everything is done by staff rather than people on the ground.  People are reduced to the role 
ﾗa ┗ﾗﾉ┌ﾐデWWヴゲく  B┌デ デｴW Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ｷゲ ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾏﾗヴW Iﾗﾏaﾗヴデ;HﾉW ﾉ;ヴｪWﾉ┞ ﾗaデWﾐ HWI;┌ゲW デｴW┞げヴW ﾗaデWﾐ a┌ﾐSｷﾐｪ 
them or have until now funded those things. (SA/C_1)  
S┌Iｴ けﾏｷヴヴﾗヴｷﾐｪげ ┘;ゲ ;Iﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWS H┞ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ﾗaaｷIWヴゲ ;ﾐS ; ┘ｷSW ヴ;ﾐｪW ﾗa TSO ﾗaaｷIWヴゲが ┘ｴﾗ ｴ;S 
worked in the city for a decade or more, some of them former members of grassroots groups. A 
similar experience was observed in Donostia; this is boldly put by a municipal councillor who was 
critical about the fusion between the two sectors:  
the third sector has been captured [by the administration] and public administration has also been 
captured by the third sector, because it is easier to delegate responsibility to the third sector as 
opposed to assuming it.  (P/D_1)  
Iﾐ Dﾗﾐﾗゲデｷ; デｴW ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ｷﾏヮ;IデWS デｴW ﾏ┌ﾐｷIｷヮ;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヮヴ;IデｷIW デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ; ヴW-
centralization of social assistance. For example, municipal government ceased sponsoring soup 
kitchens managed previously by faith groups and instead subsidized individuals directly to help them 
buy food. It also halted a concession of a youth community centre formerly ran by civil society 
associations. Re-ceﾐデヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ Sヴｷ┗Wﾐ ヮ;ヴデﾉ┞ H┞ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗaaｷIWヴゲげ ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ヴｷｪｴデゲ 
SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWが ┘ｴﾗ HWﾉｷW┗WS デｴ;デ デｴW けCﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ｴ;ゲ デﾗ ｪ┌;ヴ;ﾐデWW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヴｷｪｴデゲげ ﾗa ｷデゲ ヴWゲｷSWﾐデゲく WW 
observed that in the social services arena, Donostia Council was trying to find a balance between the 
pre-austerity partnership arrangements established with TSOs, while not letting any opportunity 
pass to recapture responsibility.     
In both cities, preparing for the rollback redux also implied new organizational arrangements in the 
running of community centres. Although the foundation of community hubs predated the impact of 
the budget cuts in Cardiff, it presaged these by helping to legitimize downloading and offloading 
tactics by making collaboration and co-production visible to the public eye. This was the case of the 
Ely and Caerau Community Hub which housed public sector providers, TSOs and community groups 
together in a single building. Multi-agency teams from all these sectors were collaborating in the 
provision of community services. In Donostia the Casa de las Mujeres provided a similar example; 
デｴW ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ﾗa ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ デﾗ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデW ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ｷﾐ デｴW Iｷデ┞ ┘;ゲ Iﾗ-
developed between community groups and municipal government, but the building was owned by 
the latter.  
Technicalization and professionalism as a means to ensure co-optive capacity   
The preparation for rollback redux developed in both cities during the pre-austerity years, from 
neighbourhood mobilizations and protest to their formalization into neighbourhood associations or 
TSOs. Their formalization required daily rule-making and rule-monitoring.  Through following specific 
processes in their organization (i.e. reporting, establishing objectives and welcoming state funding), 
many of these groups ;ﾐS TSOゲ ゲデ;ヴデWS デﾗ HW ｷﾐ┗ｷデWS ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW IｷデｷWゲげ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ﾏWWデｷﾐｪゲく TｴW┞ ﾉW;ヴﾐWS 
how to engage in dialogue with council officers; hence, the gap in managing processes for social 
service provision between council and these TSOs began to narrow. A municipal government officer 
in Donostia clearly illustrates this point:  
If we want citizens to develop their ideas we include them in a grant-funding system. The grant-
funding system is madness. I mean: piles of paperwork, incredible bureaucracyぐ then they prepare it, 
we ask them eleven thousand papers that must be ordered in a certain way otherwise they do not 
pass requirements (GO/D_1).  
In Cardiff, technicalization was found through TSOs that were highly merged into the CF system and 
Cardiff Partnership. One TSO officer explained how in becoming part of Cardiff Partnership his 
organization had to show managerial capacity to comply with the requirements of corporatism:  
Part of the condition of us running it [CF programme] was that we'd have extensive governance, we 
went through a due diligence process in terms of finance, we had to set up all the systems, HR, 
finance, governance.  Write the plan.  We've done all that, it's progressed well, we're running the [CF] 
cluster, manage the area. So being financially sustainable, but being well-governed, well-managed, 
effective, credible, valued, respectedL We have that structure and then we can be creative, we can go 
off and be wild community workers.  (TSO/C_7)    
In both cities, all types of interviewees perceived bureaucratization and its associated 
technicalization as negative. In particular, project beneficiaries and activists accused those 
Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴｷﾐｪ  デｴWゲW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ﾗa けデ┌ヴﾐｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげく B┌デ ;ゲ デｴW ヮヴW┗ｷﾗ┌ゲ 
quote illustrates, in Cardiff, TSO-CF ﾗaaｷIWヴゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣WS デｴW HWﾐWaｷデゲ ﾗa けHWIﾗﾏｷﾐｪ ﾏﾗヴW 
Iﾗヴヮﾗヴ;デWが ┘ｷデｴ ﾏﾗヴW ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWげく   
While our data in both cities confirmed the pre-austerity period helped TSOs and community groups 
to align their operative and monitoring processes in ways that mirrored council practices (i.e. 
aligning objectives, preparing business cases, monitoring user feedback, running best practice and 
a┌ﾐSヴ;ｷゲｷﾐｪ ┘ﾗヴﾆゲｴﾗヮゲぶが デｴW C;ヴSｷaa I;ゲW ｷゲ ヴW┗W;ﾉWS ;ゲ ﾏﾗヴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷI デｴ;ﾐ Dﾗﾐﾗゲデｷ;く C;ヴSｷaaげゲ 
experience yields three important points to highlight, the first also evident in Donostia.  First, as 
TSOゲげ ｷSW;ゲ HWｪ;ﾐ デﾗ ｷﾐaｷﾉデヴ;デW デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ IｷヴIﾉWゲ ﾗa Iｷデ┞ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWが デｴW┞ ｴ;S デﾗ HWIﾗﾏW ﾏﾗヴW 
business-like to be able to influence implementation of particular projects. Second, the start of the 
;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ ヮWヴｷﾗS SｷS ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ヴWｷa┞ デｴW ;ﾉｷｪﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗa TSOゲげ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ｷﾐデﾗ C;ヴSｷaa Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ┘;┞ゲ ﾗa 
doing things, but also became an opportunity to influence new processes that budget cuts 
demanded, such as commissioning of social services from TSOs and community groups. With regards 
デﾗ ﾗﾉSWヴ ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲが ; TSO ﾗaaｷIWヴ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデWSぎ   
So it's not just about what you do to survive, it's about what you do to take a little step back and say, 
how do you put in- what you can put in to this, in a mix with what can be commissioned, and how do 
you influence what they are going to be commissioning?  They [Cardiff Council] appreciate that at 
that level, because other than that, they're commissioning into a vacuum.  So if they're beginning to 
think about commissioning and you're giving them a whole load of information and evidence about 
what's needed to support older people, then that's going to become part of their whole ideology. 
(TSO/C_3)    
Third, the budget cuts prompted the need for new procedural regulation to guide the operation and 
management of service commissioning from TSOs and asset transfers from local council to private 
and community groups (i.e. libraries or community centres). This required the production of training 
and guidelines that up-skilled small TSOs and community groups to take on responsibility for service 
provision that the council and other TSOs relying on government funding, were no longer able to 
provide. Some of our interviews with government officers and politicians assumed that the city 
council had to be in charge of designing this regulation to ensure that small TSOs or community 
groups working at a neighbourhood level complied with employment, health and safety, insurance 
procedures, and safety checks of volunteers dealing with vulnerable users (i.e. children). This type of 
regulation was part of the offloading with which civil society had to be ready to comply. However, 
Cardiff Council was not fully prepared and started to work on it in 2015 with the publication of the 
Stepping Up Toolkit (Cardiff Partnership, n/d). For some citizens, such guidelines were important to 
;┗ﾗｷS ; けゲデ;デW ﾗa ;ﾐ;ヴIｴ┞げが aﾗヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉﾉﾗヴゲ ;ﾐS ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗaaｷIWヴゲ デｴW┞ ┘WヴW ;ﾐ ｷﾐ┗ｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ Iｴaos.   
Risk-shifting and the challenges of buffering conflict  
The professionalization and technicalization of TSOs was facilitated in both cities by  the passing of 
responsibility from state actors to non-state actors; but only in Cardiff through the CF programme 
was it evident that risk was being downloaded and offloaded:  from the Welsh Government, to 
Cardiff Council to TSO-CF.  
In Donostia, risk-shifting across levels of government showed in some instances a contrary tendency, 
that of re-centralization and upward shifting as a way of streamlining processes. For example, the 
management of basic income benefits was withdrawn from municipal government and instead 
began to be administered by the Basque-national government. And as mentioned earlier, there were 
instances where municipal government absorbed social-assistance costs (i.e. food vouchers) that 
side-lined the work of some TSOs. However, the preference for a paternalistic approach did not stop 
Donostia Council from experimenting with offloading risk. This was clear through the Energy Waves 
Programme, which as part of the European Capital Culture Award, provided small grants to citizen 
groups and shifted part of the cost from the council to the citizenry. La Casa de las Mujeres was 
another example as st;aa ヴWIヴ┌ｷデﾏWﾐデ Iﾗゲデゲ ┘WヴW ｴ;ﾐSﾉWS H┞ デｴW ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐく  
Iﾐ Iﾗﾐデヴ;ゲデが C;ヴSｷaa Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ヴWS┌IWS H┌SｪWデ ヮヴﾗﾏヮデWS デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ デﾗ ｷﾐデWｪヴ;デW CF ヮ;ヴデﾐWヴゲｴｷヮゲ ｷﾐデﾗ 
the broader city governance model. This passed the management costs to TSOs (redundancy and HR 
ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデぶが ┘ｴｷﾉW デｴW WWﾉゲｴ Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐWS デｴW ﾗヮWヴ;デｷ┗W Iﾗゲデゲ ﾗa デｴW ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏWげゲ 
activities. The latter arrangement helped the council to reduce its costs and the liability of 
unemployment. Although risk-shifting deepened as a result of budget cuts, the city council was also 
providing a back-up. The council was ready to intervene and help out TSO-CFs through advice and 
support to ensure that the managerial and operative responsibilities they inherited from the council 
complied with monitoring, audit and outcome requirements. A council officer explains:   
It is working really, really well because it means clusters [TSO in charge of CF] are going to carry on 
doing what they want without the confines of a big political organization [city council], but they have 
the support from a big organization in the assistance of process and audits which are not their strong 
points. (GO/C_2)  
TSOs in charge of managing and implementing CF envisaged their role as short term, especially 
because of reductions in public expenditure that funded many of these TSOs previously. Hence, one 
of the activities carried out was the empowerment of communities to become self-governing and 
entrepreneurial by becoming less financially and operationally dependent on TSOs and government. 
Examples mentioned mainly addressed youth services: holiday provision, leisure activities (music) 
and language skills.    
In Cardiff, the sharing of responsibility and risk-shifting was encompassed initially by the rhetoric of 
けIﾗ-ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ;ﾐS ┘ｴｷle it reduced the risk borne by the city council,  it was coupled with the 
challenges and threats to the council that buffering conflict involved. First, a sense of empowerment 
by local TSOs and community groups was identified during fieldwork. TSOs/ community groups 
ｷﾐデWヴ┗ｷW┘WS aWﾉデ デｴW┞ ┘WヴW ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIｷﾐｪ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ┘;┞ ﾗa デｴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW SWゲｷｪﾐ ﾗa ﾐW┘ 
procedural regulation that was needed after commissioning or by gauging opportunities to introduce 
innovative practices. The fieldwork period also coincided with several localized protests against 
closures of schools, libraries or community centres.  These activities not only increased awareness of 
the effects of budget cuts, but also made ordinary citizens and communities feel empowered, albeit 
temporarily, especially after the local council voted in spring 2015 in favour of prolonging resources 
for some community services to run for another financial year.   
Second, as the offloading process continued, Cardiff Council realized that in many cases 
communities did not know how to run community services, and also lacked the resources and time 
to do so. Local council officers made efforts to approach citizens and explain the fiscal crisis the city 
was facing. As a result, the council received expressions of interest from informal community groups 
to take over services and assets. However, a more careful consideration of what asset transfers 
ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WS SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪWS デｴWゲW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲげ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐく A ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ;ﾐ ヴWI;ﾉﾉWS ; ゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa ; ┘ﾗﾏ;ﾐ ヴ┌ﾐﾐｷﾐｪ ; 
youth-training TSO:  
I put her in touch with the Council about possibly taking over the [name of play centre]...Two things 
ｴ;ヮヮWﾐWSく  OﾐW ｷゲ ゲｴW ゲ;ｷS デｴW Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ゲ;ｷSが けCﾗ┌ﾉS ┞ﾗ┌ デ;ﾆW ﾗ┗Wヴ ;ﾉﾉ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ヮﾉ;┞ IWﾐデヴWゲ ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉいげ  
Iデ ┘;ゲ ﾉｷﾆWが けNﾗく  Dﾗﾐげデ ｴ;┗W デｴW I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ aﾗヴ デｴ;デげく B┌デ デｴ;デ デWﾉﾉゲ ┞ﾗ┌ デｴ;デ デｴW┞ ぷCﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉへ ｴ;S ゲﾗﾏW 
concerns about the capacity of the sort of friends of play centres in other parts of the city.  Number 
デ┘ﾗが ゲｴWげゲ SWIｷSWS ゲｴW SﾗWゲﾐげデ ┘;ﾐデ デﾗ デ;ﾆW ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾉｷ;HｷﾉｷデｷWゲ デｴ;デ ｪﾗ ┘ｷデｴ デ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴWゲW W┝ｷゲデｷng 
centres. (P/C_5)    
TｴW Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ ﾏWﾐデｷﾗﾐWS ヴW┗W;ﾉWS デｴ;デ デｴW Iｷデ┞ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗデﾗIﾗﾉゲ ﾗa ﾏﾗﾐｷデﾗヴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS 
complying with regulation had to become more flexible to nurture civil society empowerment and 
creativity to fulfil rollback redux. In this transition, two aspects began to indicate change.  Firstly, 
that new regulation had to find a balance between the strict procedures followed by 
council/government agencies and partial procedures followed by community organizations who 
lacked sufficient administrative and managerial capacity to respond to all regulatory and legislative 
requirements. Secondly, an acknowledgment that some of the services run by TSOs would cease to 
be free as many of these TSOs did not have the economies of scale to absorb the wages and 
infrastructure that the council used to support.   
The implications of these challenges revealed the vulnerability of Cardiff Council in relation to civil 
society, which perceived itself as empowered. As new agreements of collaboration and 
commissioning were negotiated with civil society and TSOs, the role of the council was questioned in 
ゲWデデｷﾐｪ けデｴW ヴ┌ﾉWゲげ ;ﾐS デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ｷデゲ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉゲ ｷﾐ H┌aaWヴｷﾐｪ IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデ HWｪ;ﾐ デﾗ ゲｴﾗ┘ ゲｷｪﾐゲ ﾗa Iヴ;Iﾆゲく  Tｴｷゲ 
situation was not necessarily experienced in Donostia, as untouched provision of social services, 
accompanied by a national discourse of austerity prompted the regional government to restate, 
whenever possible, its protagonist role through centralized responsibility.  
Placebo dependency, new spaces of negotiation and legitimation  
In Cardiff, the imperative to-be-seen-to-be-acting was observed in the Cardiff Debate, launched in 
mid-2014. It was a three-year programme of events, workshops and discussions on the future of 
public services involving the Cardiff Council, partner agencies and local communities across the city. 
In its first year, which coincided with the final phase of fieldwork, people were asked which services 
matter the most and to put forward ideas on how the council could do things differently to save 
money in the future. This initiative was not exhaustive, but could be claimed to be innovative as the 
first Cardiff-wide consultation on the future of local public services.    
The Cardiff Debate helped to legitimize the role of the city council. It became crucial after some 
;Iデｷ┗ｷゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ケ┌WゲデｷﾗﾐWS デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ H┌SｪWデ I┌デゲ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デｴW WﾐS ﾗa ヴﾗﾉﾉ-
over grants to TSOs and community groups. Cardiff Council, of all state agencies participating in the 
Cardiff Partnership, was under the most pressure to show that it was acting fast despite being 
┌ﾐIWヴデ;ｷﾐ ｴﾗ┘ デﾗ ヴWゲﾗﾉ┗W デｴW Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW ﾗa aｷゲI;ﾉ ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞く IﾐデWヴ┗ｷW┘WWゲ ﾏWﾐデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ けデｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ 
ﾐWWSWS デﾗ ゲ;┗W ケ┌ｷIﾆﾉ┞げ ﾗヴ けデｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ┘;ゲ ｪﾉ;S デﾗ ｪWデ ヴｷS ﾗa ヮﾉ;┞ IWﾐデヴWゲげ ゲｴﾗ┘WS デｴW ┌rgency of the 
situation. The Cardiff Debate became a space where the negotiating power of the council could be 
affirmed, backed up by Stepping Up. Publishing guidelines, consulting the public in innovative ways 
and allowing new ideas to influence the councｷﾉげゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ デﾗ IﾗヮW ┘ｷデｴ ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ ゲｴﾗ┘WS デｴ;デ デｴW 
council was acting, although without the capacity to carry on delivering social services.   
C;ヴSｷaa Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ;ﾉゲﾗ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷ┣WS ﾗﾐ ｷデゲ ヮ;ゲデ ｪｷ┗Wﾐ ｷデゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa HWｷﾐｪ ; けｪﾗﾗS Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげく TｴW ﾗヮｷﾐｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
an activist is helpful in summarizing this point:   
In Wales the state has done quite a good job at protecting the public sector from cuts and delaying 
them. There is a sense that this is a Westminster Conservative agenda and local authorities have to 
deal with it. The anger is diffused, not all focused on the local authority. There have been 
consultations going on, a lot connected with the workforce and people getting redeployed or reduced 
hours. The local authority has done this not by engaging citizens but because they are decent people 
in public service. They like the idea of partnership and they don't like to be seen as the bad guy 
cutting stuff. (SA/C_2)  
LﾗI;ﾉ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉﾉﾗヴゲ ;ﾐS ﾗaaｷIWヴゲ ヮWヴIWｷ┗WS デｴW ﾐWWS デﾗ ヴWﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗Wが ヮ;ゲデ 
relationship with civil society through a combination of two narratives: resignation to fiscal austerity 
;ﾐS デｴW Iｷデ┞げゲ ﾉﾗﾐｪ-term discourse based on partnership and co-production of services. This 
discourse was not unique to Cardiff, but to Wales more generally as it sought to differentiate from 
its English counterpart since devolution in 1999.  
Unlike Cardiff, there was no imperative for Donostia Council in this regard; but despite its unchanged 
budget, the council still wanted to be seen to be acting. As a result, it created a protectionist 
ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ デｴ;デ H┌ｷﾉデ ┌ヮﾗﾐ デｴW Iｷデ┞げゲ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ;ﾐS IﾗﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデWS デｴW 
Basque protectionist welfare discourse. The council sought ways to be seen to be acting through 
tactics of participatory planning that did not incur expense. Through projects such as Auzolan and 
Auzo Elkarteen Bilgunea, the Bildu administration sought to legitimize its role by approaching 
neighbourhood associations that valued legacies of Basque communitarianism. These associations 
located in the south of the city had historically been the most marginalized. Although critical of 
government, they were the most likely to agree with its daily process of delivery while taking 
advantage of the technical assistance and training that the council offered. Of interest was local 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗaaｷIWヴゲげ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ デｴW ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ┘ｷデｴ デｴWゲW ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴｴﾗﾗS ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘;ゲ 
not immune to the higher government level discourse of austerity.  
An officer explains:  
What I see is a social fabric, building always a relation with the [municipal] administration, 
conscientious of its limits and with a more responsible behaviour, with a different approach in 
handling themes, accepting that we can only reach so far; and this is important because in the 
bonanza years there was a game of demanding to the institution [municipal administration] and 
treating you [citizens] as a client because I could respond to everything you asked for. Aand in [the 
current] relationship I have seen more common sense, understanding that the crisis conditions the 
solutions that can emerge. (GO/D_2)  
Implication of findings  
In analyzing the preparation of the rollback redux to capture voluntarism and participation, followed 
by technicalization, we unpicked civil society and community participation during the liminal or 
transitional period between pre- and post- austerity. The analysis was further complemented by the 
direction of risk-ゲｴｷaデｷﾐｪ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ヮヴﾗIWS┌ヴ;ﾉ ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ;ﾐS ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲ デｴ;デ ｴWﾉヮWS ｷSWﾐデｷa┞ デｴW けヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲげ ﾗa 
austerity: how it was portrayed, who was to blame and, especially from our data, the strategy that 
city governments used to engage with contingency.     
The findings (Table 2) show that the two cities were preparing for a rollback redux (downloading and 
offloading) and this preparation entailed deepening technicalization through operative and 
monitoring processes that mimicked or narrowed the gap between local government and 
TSOs/community groups. Placebo dependency was present in both cities; however, in Cardiff it was 
directly associated with the need to be seen to respond to the immediacy of public expenditure cuts.  
Citizen participation and voluntarism in service provision fit into narratives of austerity resignation, 
while holding on to the Welsh historical reputation of a caring and collaborative council. The need of 
the Donostia Council to be seen to be acting locally was not an imperative due to funding cuts, but 
the impact of the broader discourse of Spanish austerity upon the council led it to develop a 
naヴヴ;デｷ┗W ﾗa ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏ デｴ;デ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷ┣WS ﾗﾐ デｴW Iｷデ┞げゲ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷﾐ デ┌ヴﾐ 
revitalized ideals of Basque communitarianism.     
The findings show that risk-shifting- comprised a double movement: downwards and beyond the 
state was non-linear for Donostia. This case showed a re-centralization of certain social-assistance 
initiatives by municipal government and of basic income support by regional government. This 
responded in great part to the uneven decentralization of welfare in Spain, which followed a 
paternalist-like approach in the Basque Country.   
However, the non-linearity of the Donostia case does not mean that neoliberal- austerity was 
absent. The Donostia Council was affected by it; the negative impact of public infrastructure 
investment cuts at higher levels of government and cuts to street maintenance prompted the 
council to create new spaces of citizen participation (i.e. Casa de las Mujeres) as a means to seek 
legitimation. In these spaces, negotiation by neighbourhood associations was limited given their 
SWヮWﾐSWﾐIW ﾗﾐ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ｷﾐｷデｷ;デｷ┗Wゲ デﾗ IヴW;デW ;ﾐS ｷﾐ┗ｷデW ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐく Tｴｷゲ SWヮWﾐSWﾐIW 
a;Iｷﾉｷデ;デWS TSOゲげ ﾏｷﾏｷIヴ┞ ﾗa ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ヮヴﾗIWS┌ヴWゲ デｴ;デ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾏﾗヴW 
professionalized regulation (i.e. business plans, outcome and monitoring reports).  The accentuated 
デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa TSOゲ ┘;ゲ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ヮヴWヮ;ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ aﾗヴ ;ﾐ ┌ﾐﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ H┌デ ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ a┌デ┌ヴW 
that might resemble the linearity evident in Cardiff (see below).  
The non-linearity of the Donostia case points towards the importance of multi-level governance as a 
factor to understand the contradictions of neoliberal austerity. Martí-Costa and Navarro (2015:37) 
argue that the higher the level of government the more exposed it is to the effects of expenditure 
cuts. Our analysis confirms this, showing that the Basque region worked as a buffer for Donostia 
against the broader discourse of austerity experienced in Spain, but also the political ideology of the 
radical left in the city and its province (Gipuzkoa) reinforced the buffer. The buffer protected 
municipal social services, albeit re-centralized regional government, while prompting the council to 
Sﾗ ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW Iｷデ┞げゲ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ﾗa ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐく   
In contrast, the Welsh case, through the CF programme and Cardiff Partnership, showed that risk-
shifting followed a more linear path and was more attuned to the Anglo-American proposition 
ゲデ;デWS H┞ PWIﾆく TｴW C;ヴSｷaa I;ゲW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデWS aヴﾗﾏ ヴWｪｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ greater alignment to the UK 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ﾗa Sﾗ┘ﾐ ;ﾐS ﾗaaﾉﾗ;Sｷﾐｪき ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ; ﾏﾗヴW ゲ┞ﾏHﾗﾉｷI ヴWゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ┘;ゲ aﾗ┌ﾐS ｷﾐ 
the combination of fiscal resignation and partnership/co-production narratives at both regional and 
city levels. This helped to mainデ;ｷﾐ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷﾏﾏWSｷ;デW ┞W;ヴゲ ;aデWヴ デｴW 
fiscal crisis.    
Tｴｷゲ ﾉｷﾐW;ヴｷデ┞ ┘W;ﾆWﾐWS C;ヴSｷaa Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ Iﾗ-opt through: the reduction of resources to 
a┌ﾐS TSOゲが デｴW ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉげゲ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ IヴW;デｷﾐｪ ﾐW┘ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;tion for deepening 
downloading and offloading of social services, and the need to organize consultation that opened 
spaces of negotiation with citizens and civil society. Nevertheless, the council relied simultaneously 
on quick responses that capitalized on previous efforts (trust, mimetism, and the city governance 
model) to keep afloat its legitimacy in times of uncertainty.   
Donostia Council showed a stronger capacity to co-opt because it continued funding TSOs. In this 
sense, Donostia seemed better to rWデ;ｷﾐ デｴW けﾃW┘Wﾉ ﾗa デｴW Iヴﾗ┘ﾐげ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴWS デﾗ C;ヴSｷaaき H┌デ ｷﾐ Hﾗデｴ 
cases the sense of national identity deployed to differentiate the cities from Spain and from England 
HWI;ﾏW ; ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ デﾗ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏｷ┣W ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ ; ヮWヴｷﾗS ﾗa デヴ;ﾐゲｷデｷﾗﾐく The 
delayed effects of the financial crisis on local government spending was an opportunity for both 
councils to capitalize on their legacies of institutional protectionism obtained by their regional 
nationalisms. The lack of mass social protest and contestation, reflected through the historical 
デヴWﾐSゲ ﾗa ヴWｪｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ a┌ﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ TSOゲ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲが ゲｴﾗ┘WS デｴW IｷデｷWゲげ 
regional paternalistic approach to governance.  
However, the different devolved fiscal policies and structures in the UK and Spain marked the 
difference between the cities, and thereby the divergence in how cooptation was experienced.   
The city comparison underlines that the fiscal dimension is not the only important factor in 
understanding how co-optive capacity upon participation fares under austerity, but also national 
identity. Although it has been argued that the question of identity (nationalism, race, etc.) does not 
work as a counterweight to the contradictions of a totalizing neoliberal capitalism (Wood, 2016:259), 
it was relevant in our analysis to illustrate the extent to which the structural inter-scalarity of 
governance (i.e. fiscal institutions) is complemented by the symbolic side of national identity found 
in everyday administrative practice (Basque communitarianism or Welsh collaboration). Although we 
recognize that the effects of nationalism may only work as a temporary resistance to austerity, our 
ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ ｴｷｪｴﾉｷｪｴデゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ゲ┌HデﾉWデ┞ aﾗヴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげゲ ヮヴ;IデｷI;l contradictions.  
In discovering how nationalism plays a role in everyday administrative practice alongside the Left 
political ideology governing the cities, our research began to unpick a way in which the durability of 
neoliberal austerity is forged and (re)embedded in periods of transition through co-optive 
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